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PROPOSED LEGISLATION
IT'S TIME TO ABOLISH DOWER AND CURTESY
IN VIRGINIA
Joseph L. Lezwis*
INTRODUCTION
N its deliberations during 1966 and 1967 regarding estates of de-
cedents, the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council gave particular
consideration to the advisability of abolishing the contingent rights of
dower and curtesy in Virginia.' The VALC had to determine what
interests, if any, should be reserved to the surviving consort, and
whether the distinction between real and personal property in intestate
succession should be abolished. 2
In its report to the 1968 Virginia General Assembly, the VALC
took note of the fact that most of today's wealth is manifested in per-
sonal property, such as life insurance, bank deposits, stocks, bonds, and
business interests, rather than land.3 As a result of this, it explained,
dower and curtesy offer little in the way of guaranteeing for the sur-
viving spouse a reasonable share of the decedent's property since they
attach only to real property.4 While recognizing the anachronistic na-
ture of dower and curtesy in modern society, the VALC appeared
reluctant to recommend abolishing them because of the predominance
of real estate values over personal property in rural areas of Virginia
and in some decedents' estates.5 It therefore merely recommended to
*Member of the Virginia Bar. B.S., Richmond, 1961; LL.B., 1964.
1The dower and curtesy interests in Virginia consist of the right to have an assign-
ment of a life estate in one-third of all the real estate whereof the deceased spouse,
or any other to his use, was at any time seized during coverture of an estate of in-
heritance, unless such interest has been lawfully barred or relinquished. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-19 (1968); First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1964).2 RtORT OF THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
GENERAL AssEAILY OF VIRGINIA ON COMMISSIONERS OF AccouNrs AND FIDUCIARIES
6 (1967).
3 Id. at 8, 9.
4 In support of this conclusion, the VALC reported that England and about two-
thirds of the states in the United States have abolished the common law estates of
dower and curtesy. Id. at 7, 9.
5Id. at 8, 9.
[299]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the General Assembly that the dower and curtesy interests be converted
into interests in fee simple.6 This recommendation was introduced in
the General Assembly as Senate Bill Number 275.
The VALC and the sponsors of the bill apparently decided that it
would be desirable to change dower and curtesy into a fee simple in-
terest in order to remove the distinction between the surviving spouse's
interest in real and personal property in case of intestate succession. By
making this change, the surviving spouse's interest in intestate realty
would be brought in line with his or her interest in intestate personalty. 7
This change would also give the surviving spouse a greater interest in
the decedent's real estate, replacing the presently inadequate dower or
curtesy interest.
The bill was referred to the Senate Committee for Courts of Justice
which failed to report it to the Senate.8 In view of the significance of
the proposed change in Virginia law suggested by the bill, a considera-
tion of potential problem areas related to this change appears in order.
PROBLEM AREAS
First, under present Virginia law, the surviving spouse takes all the
intestate realty subject to the debts of the decedent, as an heir in the
second class if the intestate leaves no issue surviving9 The surviving
spouse also takes a dower or curtesy interest prior to the rights of the
decedent's general creditors.'" If real property is sold in the lifetime
of the deceased spouse to satisfy a lien or encumbrance thereon created
6 This bill contained the following provisions:
1. That VA. CODE ANN. § 64-20 (1950) (defining the curtesy interest) be amended
by adding thereto the following sentence: "An estate by the curtesy shall be a
fee simple interest." Id. at 15.
2. That VA. CODE ANN. § 64-27 (1950) (defining the dower interest) be amended
by adding thereto the following sentence: "Dower shall be a fee simple interest."
Id. at 15, 16.
The Virginia General Assembly then combined the above sections to form VA. CoDE
ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968).
7 This would be an interest in one-third of the surplus personalty if the intestate is
survived by issue. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-11 (1968). Under VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1
(1968), the surviving spouse has no interest as an heir in intestate realty if the decedent
is survived by issue but receives only a dower or curtesy interest therein under VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968).
8 It is believed this action was taken primarily because the Committee felt that in-
sufficient consideration had been given to the effect of the bill on other provisions of
Virginia law.
9 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968).
10 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968).
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by a deed in which the survivor has united, he or she is entitled to
dower or curtesy in any surplus of the proceeds remaining after satis-
fying the lien or encumbrance. 1 If the recommendation of the VALC
is adopted, will the surviving spouse's new fee simple dower or curtesy
interest still achieve priority over general creditors in the same fashion as
present dower and curtesy, or will the new interest be treated as the
share of an heir of the estate subject to claims of general creditors of the
decedent? Presumably since the interest retains the designation of
"dower" or "curtesy," the surviving spouse will have priority over
general creditors' 2 and thus receive a greater interest in realty than in
personalty. The bill, in this respect, would increase, rather than elim-
inate, the disparity between the surviving spouse's interest in intestate
personalty and realty, and could seriously affect the rights of creditors."
Second, if any real or personal estate is conveyed or devised for the
jointure of the wife to take effect in profit or possession immediately
upon the death of the husband, such conveyance or devise in Virginia
bars her dower in real estate14 unless jointure is waived.15 There are
similar provisions in regard to the husband's curtesy.16 If it was a
purpose of the recommended change to equate the provisions on intestate
realty and intestate personalty by changing dower and curtesy into a fee
simple interest, jointure should be abolished because there is no jointure
in regard to intestate personalty. The surviving spouse is able to receive
any property, real or personal, by devise or conveyance, and still retain
his or her share of intestate personalty.17
1 1 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-28 (1968).
12 This assumption will be maintained throughout the remainder of the article.
13 "Some statutes, like that of Florida, have increased the wife's interest to a fraction
of the fee without lessening the priority over creditors. This can result in a widow
receiving a fortune when the husband had no net worth at death." 2 R. PoWELL, REXAL
PRoPERTY § 213 [1] at 170.19(19) (1967). Paul L. Sayre expresses this viewpoint:
... lIt is a rather serious thing to let the widow take one-third of the realty in
fee free from the claims of creditors, regardless of the amount of property in-
volved ... [This] may result . . . in great injury to . . . [the husband's] credi-
tors, and at the same time leave the widow decidedly more than reasonable pro-
tection for life.
Sayre, Husband and Wife as Statutory Heirs, 42 HARv. L. REv. 330, 357 (1929).
14 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-29 (1968).
16 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-30 (1968).
16VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-22 (1968).
17 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-11 (1968). Jointure does not bar the surviving spouse from
taking an intestate share of real property as an heir under VA. CoDE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968).
Professor Emerson G. Spies, in an excellent article, discusses in some detail the com-
plications introduced into the Virginia law of decedents' estates by the jointure pro-
visions. Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
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Third, if the surviving spouse renounces the decedent's will, he or she
takes one-third of the surplus of the decedent's entire personal estate
(including intestate personalty) if there are issue surviving, or one-half
of the surplus of the entire personal estate if there are no issue surviving."'
If the decedent leaves issue surviving, the renouncing spouse takes a
dower or curtesy interest in both the decedent's testate and intestate
realty free of the claims of creditors, or a dower or curtesy interest in
testate realty plus a fee simple interest in all of the intestate realty if the
decedent leaves no issue surviving; such fee simple interest being sub-
ject, of course, to the claims of creditors. Under Senate Bill Number 275,
the renouncing spouse would take a dower or curtesy interest consisting
of a one-third fee simple interest in all testate realty plus a one-third fee
simple interest in all intestate realty if the decedent was survived by issue.
Why should the proposed one-third fee simple dower or curtesy interest
not be subject to the claims of creditors as is the one-third or one-half
interest in personalty? Why should the surviving spouse, in a case
where the decedent is not survived by issue, receive only one-third of
the decedent's realty upon renunciation of his will while receiving one-
half of his personalty? Why should the surviving spouse receive a one-
third fee simple interest in testate realty plus all the decedent's intestate
realty when he or she renounces the decedent's will in a case of partial in-
testacy, while he or she receives only one-third or one-half of the
surplus personal estate under these circumstances?
Fourth, the surviving spouse takes all the decedent's intestate realty,
if there are no issue surviving, as an heir of the decedent, subject to the
claims of his creditors. 19 The survivor takes a one-third fee simple interest
as dower or curtesy under Senate Bill Number 275 in all the decedent's
realty prior to the claims of general creditors of the decedent. If the
decedent's estate is insolvent, can the surviving spouse elect to take the
one-third dower or curtesy interest ahead of creditors or must the spouse
take his or her fee simple interest as an heir subject to the claims of
creditors? Presumably the surviving spouse has the right to make an
election as to what interest he or she will take, but this is unclear.20 It
18 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (1968). The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
surviving spouse cannot take all the intestate personalty plus one-half of the testate
personalty if he or she renounces the will where the partially intestate decedent leaves
no issue surviving, but is allowed only one-half of the surplus of the entire personal
estate (including both testate and intestate personalty). Newton v. Newton, 199 Va.
785, 102 S.E. 2d 312 (1958).
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968).
20 Of course, it must be acknowledged that the question of whether the surviving
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would seem advisable to clarify this matter at the time any changes are
made in the dower and curtesy statutes.
Fifth, the bill seriously affects the position of those who have purchased
realty subject to an inchoate dower or curtesy interest under the assump-
tion that the interest of the grantor's spouse would end upon his or her
death, and prior thereto would be, at most, only a life interest in one-third
of the realty. Under Senate Bill Number 275, upon the grantor's death,
the surviving spouse would possess a fee simple interest in one-third of the
realty which would pass upon his or her death to his or her heirs. This
is particularly significant when it is realized that possibly the grantee
could not even rely upon his adverse possession to bar the dower or cur-
tesy interest.21 If Senate Bill Number 275 were enacted, a prospective
purchaser could not afford to buy a parcel of realty if his title examina-
tion disclosed a deed far back in the chain of title which failed to recite
the marital status of the grantor. He could no longer rely on the probable
advanced age of the grantor's spouse as a minimization of his risk.22
Sixth, Senate Bill Number 275 does not state whether the change in
the dower and curtesy interests would apply (1) to dower and curtesy
interests vested at the time the change in the law would become effec-
tive, (2) to inchoate dower and curtesy interests existing at the time
the change in the law would become effective or (3) only to inchoate
dower and curtesy interests arising after the change in the law would
become effective. This uncertainty would surely create much confusion
and could raise constitutional questions. It was probably intended that
the bill apply to inchoate dower and curtesy interests arising both be-
spouse can elect which of the two interests to take has remained unresolved in Virginia
ever since the surviving spouse became an heir. Such right of election between a
dower or curtesy interest and a fee simple interest as an heir has been permitted in
other states. See In re Clemmon's Estate, 242 Iowa 1248, 49 N.W. 2d 883 (1951); 25
Am. JuR. 2d, Dower and Curtesy, § 38 (1966).
2 1 MINOR, REAL PROPERTY § 255 (2d ed. 1928). While Minor supports this conclusion,
he points out that an argument could be made that if the husband's right of entry or
action were barred by the statute of limitations before the husband's death, the wife
would not be endowed since the statute only gives her dower in case she would have been
entitled to it if the husband had recovered possession of the land, and he could not
have recovered possession after the right was barred by the statute of limitations.
Minor concludes, however, that the provision upon which this argument is based
simply means that the right of entry or action must be in connection with the kind of
estate in which dower is allowed where the husband has the possession. Id.
22 The spouse might have survived the grantor and become vested with a one-third
fee simple interest in the property. If the spouse survived the grantor and then died,
this interest would pass under the spouse's will to his or her heirs if he or she died
intestate.
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fore and after the effective date of the change in the law, but not to
interests vested prior to the effective date thereof.
Seventh, Senate Bill Number 275 fails to remove restrictions on the con-
veyancing of real property because the grantor's spouse must still
join in a conveyance to release his or her dower or curtesy interest in
order to give the grantee a clear tide. In fact, the bill intensifies these
restrictions by increasing the dower or curtesy interest to a fee simple
interest.
From these problem areas it can be seen that Senate Bill Number 275
fails to solve many problems already existing, and in fact, creates numer-
ous problems, only a few of which have been mentioned.21 It is regret-
table that the 1968 Virginia General Assembly did not see fit to abolish
dower and curtesy in Virginia and revise the law of decedents' estates
to give the surviving spouse the same rights in real property as in per-
sonal property.24 Although this article will attempt to establish the
23There are many more. For example, should the surviving spouse enjoy the
quarantine right granted under VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-33 (1968) if he or she is to
receive a one-third fee simple interest in the decedent's real estate? Moreover, would
not the statutes which provide for the commutation and assignment of dower [VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-34, 35, 36 (1968)] be rendered obsolete by the proposed change in
the law except in regard to dower and curtesy presumably not affected by Senate Bill
No. 275 (i.e., dower and curtesy interests already vested on the effective date of the
bill)?
24 House Bill No. 732, introduced in the 1968 Virginia General Assembly, provided that
VA. CODE ANN. § 64-1 (1950) [now § 64.1-1 (1968)] would be amended to give one-third
of the intestate realty to the surviving spouse and the remainder to children and de-
scendents of the decedent. It is understood that this bill arose from deliberations by the
Virginia Code Commission. The sponsors of the bill apparently were seeking to ac-
complish the same result as the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 275, i.e., to bring the sur-
viving spouse's interest in intestate realty in line with his or her interest in intestate
personalty under VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-11 (1968), which gives the surviving spouse one-
third of the surplus personalty if the intestate is survived by issue. They attacked the
problem, however, by dealing directly with VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968) rather than
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968) (the dower and curtesy statute).
The bill was referred to the House Committee for Courts of Justice which reached
the conclusion that this matter should be studied prior to any change in the law. As
a result, it was resolved by the House, the Senate concurring, that the Virginia State
Bar and the Virginia State Bar Association be requested to conduct a study of this
matter and report thereon to the Committees for Courts of Justice of the House of
Delegates and Senate prior to the next regular session of the General Assembly.
H.DJ. Res. 170 (1968).
It is believed the failure of House Bill No. 732 to deal in any degree with the dower
and curtesy statute was one reason that this legislation did not move forward. The
General Assembly apparently took the view that the problem was far too complicated
to be solved by a simple amendment to one statute. This is further proof that a
complete revision of the law of decedents' estates is necessary before any changes can
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advisability of abolishing both dower and curtesy, the emphasis in the
remainder of the article will be placed on the abolition of dower, since
it is believed there would be no substantial opposition to the abolition
of curtesy if dower were abolished. 25
ABOLITION OF DOWER
In the Middle Ages land was the principal source of wealth and a hus-
band had neither life insurance, pensions, social security, joint bank ac-
counts nor securities. Dower was desirable because it protected the
widow and prevented her from becoming a burden on society.26 Today,
however, the position of the widow is not the same as it was in the Middle
Ages. The widow has no great need for dower today because of her
social security payments, her rights as an heir to a substantial part of her
husband's intestate personal property and real property (if the husband
be made in the law affecting dower and curtesy and the rights of the surviving spouse
as an heir of the decedent.
25 Those who oppose the abolition of dower and curtesy seem primarily concerned
with protecting the wife from the husband's depletion of his estate prior to death. It
seems they wish to retain curtesy because it would be unfair to take away the husband's
curtesy rights but retain the wife's dower rights.
The lack of concern about protecting the husband is shown by the fact that under
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (1968), a surviving husband is not entitled to curtesy in the
equitable separate estate of the wife if such right thereto has been expressly excluded
by the instrument creating same; but there is no similar provision for the benefit of
the husband in regard to his separately owned realty. The Virginia Code Commission
suggested to the General Assembly that VA. CODE ANN. § 64-22(1950) [now § 64.1-21
(1968)] be amended to make the separate equitable estate provision applicable to the
husband, but this suggestion was rejected by the General Assembly. REPORT OF TH
VA. CODE Com 'N To Tm GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VA. ON REVISION OF
TiTLE 64 OF THE CODE OF VA. 5 (1968).
26 In the Middle Ages, as in modem times, dower provided a widow with a
measure of economic and social security. It likewise afforded support for younger
children who, because of the role of primogeniture, ordinarily took no rights in
their father's land. Land was the chief source of substance at that time; unless
she had land of her own, a widow would frequently have been destitute without
some rights in the lands of her husband. The husband's chattels were generally
few, and not often of great value; and, even if his personal property were con-
siderable, his widow's assurance of any share therein was uncertain . . . If he
died intestate and she survived him, she was entitled to an aliquot share of the
personalty, but that share was subject to the claim of creditors. The dower
interest, on the other hand, was not subject to the payment of her husband's debts
and was the widow's exclusively to enjoy for her life. Dower also gave a widow
social standing in the community in an age when social status was closely con-
nected with land and tenure.
1 AM EUCAN LAW OF PROPERTY & 5.3, at 622-623 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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leaves no issue surviving),27 and her rights to take against any will that
she deems unfair to her.28 In addition, title to any joint bank account,29
real estate owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety,30
and any automobile owned by the husband and wife as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship3 vests in the widow upon the husband's
death. Moreover, the widow is usually the principal beneficiary of the
husband's life insurance and pension benefits.3 2
Dower does not afford as much protection as is generally believed
because there are numerous ways it can be defeated. If the husband
owns realty jointly with others and there is a partition suit resulting in a
sale of the property, the contingent dower interest is barred even though
the wife is not a party to the suit.3 3 To defeat the dower interest, the
husband may have real estate conveyed to himself and another as joint
tenants with the right of survivorship so that he will not be seised of an
estate of inheritance therein at death.14 He may also defeat dower by
having real estate conveyed to himself as a life tenant with a general
power of appointment, and a remainder interest reserved for his children
upon his death if the power of appointment is not exercised.35
If real estate is conveyed to a corporation, the stock of the corporation
is personal property and not subject to dower even if the corporation
is solely owned by the husband. Thus, if the husband incorporates his
real estate at the time of acquisition, he can prevent his wife from exer-
cising any control over its transfer.3 6 Where the husband gives a purchase
27 VA. CODE AlN . § 64.1-11, 1 (1968).
28 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-13 (1968).
29 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (1968).
30 If clearly set our in the instrument. See Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 759, 149 S.E.
605 (1929).
31 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-68.1 (1968).
32 See Cook, American Land Law Reforn: Legal Co-Ownership, Dower and Curtesy,
1960 DuKE L. J. 485, 503; Report on Bill to Limit Dower and Curtesy to Land Owned
on Death, 43 MAss. L. Q. 68-75 (Oct., 1958).
33 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-695 (1957). Moreover, the widow's dower interest does not
attach to the proceeds of sale.
3 4 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20, 21 (1959).
35 See MINOR, supra note 21, at § 286. But see Note, Powers of Appointment in Vir-
ginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 711, 715 (1961) for a discussion of the possibility that the posses-
sion of a life estate coupled with a general power of appointment, exercisable both
during life or by testamentary disposition, will be treated as constituting fee simple
ownership of the property in spite of VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7 (1950).
36 See MINOR, supra note 21, at § 288. If the public policy in Virginia is to give the
wife some control over her husband's conveyance of real estate, it is certainly not a well-
protected public policy when it can be so easily defeated by simply incorporating the
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money deed of trust when real property is conveyed to him, the widow's
dower interest is subject thereto by virtue of the doctrine of transitory
seisin.37 If the husband wants to defeat the wife's dower and marital
rights, he can have real estate purchased by him conveyed to a trust under
the terms of which he retains a life interest in the trust corpus and such
control thereof that he has almost as much enjoyment of and control over
the property as he would have if he held the fee simple title.3 In Vir-
ginia, the widow has been highly unsuccessful in attacking this and
similar devices as illusory transfers or as a fraud on her marital rights.30
Even if not defeated, the present dower interest in Virginia offers, at
best, only limited protection to the widow, as this interest will represent
only a small portion of the value of the decedent's real estate, especially
if dower is commuted when the widow is advanced in years. Moreover,
if the husband desires to defeat the property rights of his wife upon
his death, he can rid himself of all his personal estate during his life-
time, without any recourse available to the wife to stop him from doing
this or to reclaim the property upon his death. 41 Since, in modern society,
real estate. Judging from the abundance of incorporated real estate in Virginia, this
method of destroying the rights of the wife has been resorted to quite frequently.
37 Id. at § 257.
38 The wife would not be entitled to dower because the husband was not seised of
an estate of inheritance as required by VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968).
39 Other devices the husband might employ to defeat his wife's property rights
include gifts causa mortis and deposits in a bank account in the name of the husband
as "trustee" for a designated person. A good example of the futility of a widow's
attack upon these devices as constituting illusory transfers or a fraud on her marital
rights is the case of Gentry v. Bailey, 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 594 (1850). There the husband
conveyed certain personal property to a trustee to be held in trust with income and
possession to the husband. Upon the husband's death, the trust estate was to be
equally divided among his children by his first wife, but he reserved the right to alter
the distribution to each child.
The husband died and the wife filed suit to attack the trust as being a will in disguise
and claimed that she should be entitled to treat the trust property as part of her hus-
band's estate. In denying the wife's claim, the Supreme Court of Appeals pointed out
that in Virginia a husband has the power to alienate, by sale or gift, during his lifetime,
the whole or any part of his personal estate and thereby exclude his widow from any
interest therein. It also stated, by way of dictum, that the wife might have been suc-
cessful in this suit if the husband had retained an absolute and complete power of
revocation over the trust corpus. 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) at 604. Yet the later case of Russell
v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, 103 S.E. 652 (1920) appears to hold that even revocability
does not prevent an inter vivos trust from being valid. See also Freed v. Judith Realty
Corp., 201 Va. 791, 113 S. E.2d 850 (1960); Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S.E. 420 (1909);
Lightfoot v. Colgin, 5 Hen. & M. (19 Va.) 42 (1813); 1955-1963 OPINIONs OF BROCICEN-
BROUGH LAMB 86 (1964). Cf. Norris v. Barbour, 188 Va. 723, 51 S.E.2d 334 (1949).
40 Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S.E. 420 (1909). There the Supreme Court of Appeals
stated that while a husband cannot, by will, defeat his wife's claim to her distributive
1969]
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the value of the husband's personal estate is usually much greater than
the value of his real estate, it would seem that, instead of being so con-
cerned about depletion of the husband's real estate, some means should
be found to protect the wife from the depletion of the more valuable
personal estate. 41
After considering the limited advantages of dower as compared with
its numerous disadvantages, even its most adamant proponents must
admit that there is serious doubt whether dower is worth saving.
From the point of view of transferees and creditors of the husband,
inchoate dower is an encumbrance upon title which impairs market-
ability. From the point of view of title searchers and conveyancers it
frequently presents unexpected difficulties. It is a serious question
whether the policy in favor of protecting the wife may not be out-
weighed by the disadvantages of the restrictions upon the husband's
power of alienation and the litigation arising from such restrictions.42
OTHER STATES
At this point it might be helpful to take a brief glance at how other
states have dealt with the problems created by dower and curtesy. Some
states have abolished dower and curtesy and eliminated the requirement
that the grantor's spouse join in the deed conveying realty. For example,
in North Dakota, dower and curtesy have been abolished. 43 The owner
of realty can convey it without his spouse's consent, and the entire estate
of a decedent may be disposed of by will, subject only to the homestead
rights of the surviving spouse. 4" In Mississippi, common law dower has
share of his personal estate, he may do so by an irrevocable disposition of property in
his lifetime, although he secures a life estate to himself, and his purpose is to defeat the
claim of his wife as one of his distributees.41What logical reason is there for a husband being able to transfer his personalty at
will but his realty only with his wife's consent? This situation appears particularly
ludicrous when stock of a corporation owning only real estate can be transferred
without the wife's consent.
42 1 A RiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1 at 692-693 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Other
criticisms of dower have been summed up by Powell as follows:
... Modern dissatisfactions with common law dower have proceeded from two
convictions, first that an estate for life in a third of the husband's estates of in-
heritance is too small a share of his land ownership to provide for a widow's
needs; and second, that unqualified priority of dower over creditors of the de-
ceased husband is unfair.
2 R. PowELL, REALPRoPERTY, § 213 [1] at 170.18 (1967).
43 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-0709, 56-0102 (1960).
44 The homestead in North Dakota is an estate for the life of the surviving spouse
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been abolished and the grantor's spouse need not join in a deed of con-
veyance.45 Where a husband dies intestate in Mississippi leaving no
children surviving, his widow is entitled to his entire estate after payment
of debts, and when the deceased husband dies intestate leaving a child
or childen, his widow gets a child's part of the estate.4" The widow in
Mississippi may renounce her husband's will within six months after
probate and take her intestate share, but in this situation she can receive
only one-half of the real and personal estate.47
Other states have abolished dower and curtesy but have inserted pro-
visions in their laws designed to protect the grantor's spouse by pre-
venting a conveyance of realty without the consent of such spouse.
Missouri has abolished dower and curtesy and replaced it with a home-
stead allowance, but, in that state, any conveyance of real estate without
the consent of the grantor's spouse duly acknowledged, is deemed to be
in fraud of the spouse's marital rights.4 Dower and curtesy have also
been abolished in North Carolina,4 but to keep the husband from de-
pleting his estate, the surviving spouse can elect to take a life estate in
one-third of the value of the real property owned by the deceased
spouse during coverture. ° Thus, if the husband in North Carolina at-
tempts to convey his realty without his wife joining in the deed, his ven-
dee will take title thereto subject to the spouse's right of election, just as
until he or she remarries; if there is no surviving spouse, or if the surviving spouse dies
before all the children reach majority, it goes to the children until the youngest reaches
majority. Meidinger v. Security State Bank, 55 ND. 301, 213 N.W. 850 (1927). The
extent of the homestead is up to two acres of land, if within a town, not exceeding
$40,000 in value, or up to 160 acres if not within a town. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01
(Supp. 1967).
One writer has suggested that more adequate protection should be afforded the
surviving spouse, but he questions the advisability of reviving dower and curtesy.
Meschke, Estates in North Dakota, 30 N.D.L. REV. 299-300 (1954).
45 Miss. CODE ANN. § 453 (1956).
46 Miss. CODE A-,N. § 470 (1956).
47 Miss. CODE AaN. § 668 (1956).
48Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 474.290, 150 (Supp. 1955). The homestead allowance
goes to the surviving spouse and unmarried minor children and consists of an
amount not exceeding 50% of the value of the estate but not to exceed $7,500 in any
event. See also Dribben, Dower, Homestead, Homestead Allowance and Release of
Marital Rights under the New Missouri Probate Code, 21 Mo. L. REv. 151 (1956).
4 9 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (1966).
50N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1966). The North Carolina General Statutes Commission
proposed to the state legislature a Homestead Statute which would have made void
every conveyance of realty by the husband without the wife's jointure unless he proved
to the clerk of the recording court that the conveyance did not include his principal
place of residence. This was rejected in favor of the "election" provision.
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he would take subject to dower before it was abolished. 51 Still other
states have retained dower and curtesy but have restricted their appli-
cation to realty of which the deceased spouse is seised at death.52 This
facilitates free alienation of realty during the grantor's lifetime.53
The Model Probate Code would abolish the estates of dower and
curtesy. Upon intestacy, the Code would allow the surviving spouse to
take one-half the net estate if the intestate is survived by issue; or the first
$5,000 and one-half the remainder of the net estate if there is no sur-
viving issue, but the intestate is survived by one or more parents, or their
brothers or sisters, or their issue; or all the net estate if there is no surviv-
ing issue, or parent, or issue of a parent. If the decedent leaves a will, the
Model Probate Code would provide that the surviving spouse could
elect to receive his or her intestate share until the value of the share
amounts to $5,000 and of the residue of the estate above the part from
which the full intestate share amounts to $5,000, one-half the estate that
would have passed to the surviving spouse if the testator had died in-
testate.54
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN VIRGINIA LAW
If the arguments advanced against the retention of dower and curtesy
in this article and the examples of other states, which have moved to
abolish these archaic institutions, convince the Virginia General Assem-
bly that it is time to abolish dower and curtesy in Virginia and com-
pletely revise the law of decedents' estates, the following changes in
Virginia law are suggested.
1. A statute should be enacted abolishing dower and curtesy in re-
gard to real estate owned by persons dying on or after the effective date
of the statute.5 5 Ample justification for doing this has already been
51For a discussion of the North Carolina law, see McCall, North Carolina's New
Intestate Succession Act, 39 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1960).
52 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., Ch. 189 § 1 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1952)"
TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-603 (1955).
53 For a further discussion of statutes modifying or abolishing dower and curtesy.
see PowEL, supra note 42, at § 213; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 551, 575 (3rd ed. 1939);
4A THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 1910, 1727 (1961); 25 AM. JvR. 2d, Dower and
Curtesy, § 38-48 (1966).
54 See Toelle, Succession Under the Model Probate Code, Some Comparisons with
the Montana-California Law, 13 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1952); Simes, Model Probate Code,
at 59, 69 (1946).
55 This would have the effect of abolishing inchoate dower and curtesy on and after
the effective date of the statute without affecting dower and curtesy vested prior to the
effective date of the statute. Such legislative action would be in accordance with the
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outlined in this article, but since the article will be read primarily by
lawyers, most of whom engage frequently in real estate transactions,
it might be well to mention some practical advantages to the attorney
involved in a real estate transaction that would be derived from the
elimination of dower and curtesy.
(a) It would no longer be necessary for the attorney to take the
word of a grantor that he is unmarried or to search the court records
for divorce proceedings if he says he is divorced.
(b) Frequently at a closing, one spouse appears with a deed which
has already been signed by the other. It is impossible to ascertain whether
or not the signature is actually that of the spouse. This would no longer
be important.
(c) In examining titles in the future, when it is found that no recital
has been made as to the marital status of the grantor, no question will
arise. This is a major problem today even if the lack of recital occurs
far back in the chain of title because adverse possession, which removes
many title defects by the passage of time, possibly will not serve to bar
dower and curtesy.
(d) A grantor's recalcitrant spouse would not be able to prevent the
sale of real estate by refusal to sign the deed of conveyance.
(e) There would be no need to worry if the grantor's spouse were
mentally incompetent and therefore unable to execute the deed.
(f) Real estate transactions could be more rapidly conducted without
the need to arrange for the signing of a deed by the grantor's spouse.
(g) The attorney would not have to create a trust or corporation to
which the real estate could be conveyed in a situation where the pur-
chaser wished to prevent his spouse from having a veto power over a
later conveyance of the property.5 6
2. The statutes relating to descent of intestate realty and distribution
of intestate personalty should be repealed and a new statute enacted,
giving the surviving spouse a share of the decedent's net estate (including
realty and presonalty) after payment of the decedent's debts, funeral
expenses and administration expenses. For example, it might be pro-
opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Wilson, 195 Va. 1060, 81 S.E.2d
605 (1954), where the Court stated that the wife's inchoate right of dower during
coverture may be abridged or taken away by a statute before the husband's death, but
it cannot thereafter be so abridged.
56 See Four Pending Bills of Importance to Landowners and Their Counsel, 1. Shall
Dower and Curtesy Be Abolished and If So to W Zhat Extent? 39 MAss. L.Q. 21 (Dec.
1954).
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vided that the surviving spouse receive one-third of the net estate if the
decedent leaves issue surviving and all of the net estate if he leaves no
issue surviving. 57 A further provision might be that in case the net
estate fails to exceed a certain amount (such as $10,000), the entire net
estate will pass to the surviving spouse even if the decedent leaves issue
surviving.
3. The right of the surviving spouse to renounce the decedent's
will58 should be retained, but the statute setting forth rights upon re-
nunciation should be amended to provide that the spouse would receive,
upon renunciation, a certain portion of the net estate (including per-
sonalty and realty). For example, it might be provided that the re-
nouncing spouse would receive one-third of the net estate if the de-
cedent leaves issue surviving or one-half of same if the decedent dies
without issue surviving. A further provision might be that such spouse
would receive all of the net estate if it did not exceed a certain amount
(such as $10,000).
4. It is felt that one should not be unduly concerned about an abso-
lute transfer of his estate by the spouse during his lifetime. Few persons
would transfer a substantial portion of their property without retaining
some enjoyment and control thereof to insure provision for their needs
prior to death. One should, however, be concerned about the so-called
illusory transfers, previously discussed in this article, whereby a spouse
retains the income from property and control thereof during his life-
time, with the property passing outside his estate upon his death to bene-
ficiaries selected by him, free of the property rights of the surviving
spouse. Abolition of dower and curtesy would increase the need for
protection against illusory transfers because the grantor's spouse would
no longer be able to prevent a transfer of real property without his or
her consent. This problem should and can be met by enactment of a
statute in Virginia, preventing a person from being able to defeat the
rights of his surviving spouse by such easy and obvious means. In draft-
ing such a law, a statute recently enacted by the State of New York
could serve as an invaluable guide.5 9 The New York statute appears to
57 This is in line with the thinking of the sponsors of Senate Bill No. 275 and the
sponsors of House Bill No. 732, previously discussed in this article.
58 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (1968).
59 N.Y. Es-rATEs, POWERS AND TRuSTS LAW 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967) provides that the
following transactions shall be treated as testamentary substitutes and the capital value
thereof, as of the decedent's death, shall be included in the decedent's net estate as
property subject to the rights of the surviving spouse who elects to take against the
decedent's will:
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offer a more workable solution than other plans that have been sug-
gested, °6 however, it by no means affords complete protection to the
surviving spouse. 61
5. It is believed the widow could receive protection from the deple-
tion of her husband's estate by his creditors through utilization of the
homestead exemption law.62 If the homestead law is to be relied upon to
protect the widow, it would seem advisable to retain the homestead
exemption in essentially its present form but to increase the amount of
property subject to exemption on the death of the householder. 63
6. An alternative to utilization of the homestead exemption would be
1. Gifts causa mflortis.
2. Money deposited by the decedent in a joint checking account with another
payable to the survivor.
3. Money deposited in a bank account in the name of the decedent in trust for
another and remaining on deposit at the decedents death.
4. Any disposition of property made by the decedent whereby property is held, at
the date of his death, by the decedent and another person as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship.
5. Any disposition of property made by the decedent, in trust or otherwise, to the
extent that the decedent at his death retained, either alone or in conjunction with
another person, by the express provisions of the disposing instrument, a power to
revoke such disposition or a power to consume, invade or dispose of the principal
thereof.
60 For example, Simes states that any gift made by a married person within two years
of the time of death is deemed to be in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving
spouse, unless shown to the contrary. Simes, supra note 54, at 68.
611t is pointed out in Amend, The Surviving Spouse and the Estates Powers and
Trusts Law, 33 BRooryv L. REv. 530, 538 (1967) that while the New York law covers
many transactions designed to defeat the rights of the surviving spouse, it excludes
other devices which may continue to prove fruitful means of evasion, e.g., joint and
P.O.D. United States Savings bonds, life insurance and powers of appointment, and
all transfers which are complete just prior to the death of the decedent. Perhaps Virginia
could improve on the New York statute by discovering a means to cope with some of
these devices.62 VA. CoDE ANw. § 34-4 (1953). Under this section no distinction is made between
realty and personalty. This will facilitate use of the exemption to protect both realty and
personalty received by the surviving spouse. After the death of the householder, the
real estate set apart remains exempt from his debts as well as the debts of his widow
until her death or remarriage. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-10 (1953). In the event the house-
holder did not utilize his homestead exemption during his lifetime, upon his death his
widow could petition the court to set it aside. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-11, 15 (1953).
63 Protecting the widow through the homestead exemption is a much more satis-
factory means than through the dower interest. The dower interest would be of too
little value to protect a widow whose husband's realty holdings are limited, and of
too much value in regard to the rights of creditors if the husband is a wealthy land-
owner. The use of the homestead exemption would give the General Assembly some
control over the amount of exempt property.
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to provide that the first $10,000 (or some other specified amount) of
the decedent's property passing to the surviving spouse would be received
free of the claims of decedent's creditors. This would offer protection
to both the surviving husband and the surviving wife, as the homestead
exemption, in its present form, does not protect the surviving husband
from claims of his deceased wife's creditors.
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to demonstrate that while a
change in Virginia law relating to dower and curtesy is desirable, and,
in fact, long overdue, such change should be made only after carefully
considering the effect on other provisions of Virginia law. If dower and
curtesy is abolished, the law of decedents' estates must be revised to
remove the distinction between the treatment of real property and per-
sonal property. Yet such a revision must protect the surviving spouse
in such a way as not to unduly interfere with the alienation of property
by the owner thereof or the rights of his creditors. Although it is an-
ticipated that many will disagree with some or all of the comments made
in the foregoing discussion, it is hoped that, at least, this discussion will
stimulate thinking about these important matters.
